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FEDERAL SUPREMACY AND STATE ANTI-SUBVERSIVE
LEGISLATION*
Alan Reeve Huntt
legislatures have been prompted by international tensions of
recent years to enact new and stringent anti-subversive laws, thus
adding to an already large body of statutes directed against various
forms of subversion.1 Many of these statutes are open to serious objection on constitutional ·grounds. The purpose of this article is to examine those objections which are based upon the notion either that federal power in the area is exclusive or that Congress, expressly or by
necessary inference, has pre-empted the field.

S

TATE

I
Four decisions have been selected for close scrutiny as being of particular value in illuminating the questions of federal supremacy and
state anti-subversive legislation. The earliest of these decisions was
rendered shortly after World War I by the Supreme Court in Gilbert v. Minnesota.2 A Minnesota statute made it a misdemeanor to
teach or advocate orally or in writing that men should not enlist in the
military forces of the United States or the State of Minnesota. Gilbert
was convicted, fined and imprisoned for a violation of this statute. His
conviction was affirmed by the state supreme court. He contended that
the statute was unconstitutional on the ground that power over the
subject matter was vested exclusively in Congress by reason of sole
congressional powers to "provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States," to "declare War," to "raise and support
Armies," and to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces."3 States are expressly prohibited, moreover,
from engaging in war "unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay."4 The Supreme Court, speaking
,,. This article is a revision of a paper prepared in conjunction with the Constitutional
Law seminar at the University of Michigan Law School in the Spring of 1954.-Ed.
t J. D. 1954, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 See GELLHoBN, THB STATES AND StmVERSION (1952), for a discussion of some of
the state programs. In appendices A and B, Professor Gellhom has set out a classification
of state laws and citations for each state, as of January 1, 1951. See also notes, 61 HARv.
L. RBv. 1215 (1948); 66 HARv. L. RBv. 327 (1952). The latter is particularly apposite
to the topic of this article.
2 254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920).
3 These powers are delegated to Congress by art. I, §8 of the Constitution.
4 U.S. CoNST., art. I, §10.
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through Justice McKenna, rejected this argument. The Minnesota
statute was held to be an appropriate aid to the federal war powers based
upon legitimate interests of the state in ensuring the successful recruiting of its citizens to serve in national military forces. Further, the statute was declared to be sustainable simply as a local police measure
looking to prevention of breaches of the peace and having only an
incidental effect on the concededly federal function of raising armies.
The judgment of the Minnesota court was affirmed.
. Chief Justice White dissented stating that Congress had occupied
the field. 5 Justice Brandeis, dissenting at greater length, argued that
federal power over enlistments in the military forces and the conduct
of the war was exclusive. Alternatively, he argued that even if the
power were not exclusive, Congress had occupied the field by passage
of the Federal Espionage Act of 1917 with the result that any and all
state legislation in the same area must fall since " 'when the United
States has exercised its exclusive powers ... so far as to take possession
of the field, the States can no more supplement its requirements than
they can annul them.' "6 Such legislation, moreover, was beyond the
area of legitimate state concern once Congress had acted since the primary responsibility for preserving the state government rests upon the
federal government. Finally, Justic~ Brandeis found a repugnancy
between the Minnesota statute and congressional policy in two respects.
First, it had long been the policy of Congress to provide that enlistments
in United States military forces should be the result of an informed
and free choice.7 Second, Congress in the Federal Espionage Act had
prohibited only certain tangible obstructions to the conduct of the war
committed with criminal intent, whereas the Minnesota act prohibited
speech and required no such intent. Justice Brandeis concluded by
expressing his doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute when
further tested as against the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In 1939 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted an Alien
Registration Act similar in effect to registration statutes enacted previously by a number of other states.8 Such laws can very clearly be
11254 U.S. 325 at 334, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920).
6 Id. at 342, quoting Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 250 U.S.
566 at 569, 40 S.Ct. 36 (1919).
7 Justice Brandeis noted that the policy of voluntary enlistments had been departed
from only once-during the Civil War. He cited United States Army recruiting regulations providing that potential recruits must be given all the facts and information before
being signed on. Id. at 339.
s The Pennsylvania act is cited as Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1949) tit. 35, §§1801 to
1806. There were at the time nineteen states which had statutes or ordinances requiring
some form of registration by aliens. This point was made by Justice Stone in his dissent
0
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placed in the category of "anti-subversive legislation" since the registration provisions are generally intended as an aid to the enforcement
of other provisions which forbid various forms of subversive activity on
the part of aliens. Many of these statutes are in terms operative only
in time of war or when public necessity requires. They reflect a general fear and distrust of aliens engendered by two world wars. The
Pennsylvania act required the annual registration, with stated exceptions, of aliens over eighteen years of age. Registrants received an alien
identi:6cation card which they were required to carry at all times and
to produce on demand of any police officer. Fine or imprisonment or
both were provided for failure to register and also for failure to carry
the identi:6cation card and to produce it on proper demand. Willfulness was not an element of the offense. At the suit of Davidowitz, an
alien, a three-judge district court enjoined enforcement of the act on
the ground, inter alia, that it impinged upon federal legislative powers.9
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, affirmed
the judgment of the district court, and the case of Hines 11. Davidowitz:10 has since become an important statement of doctrine with respect
to federal power over the alien.
The decision went upon the ground :first that by the enactment of
the Federal Registration Act of 194011 Congress had closed the :field to
state alien registration acts. Justice Black passed the question whether
the registration of aliens is an exclusive federal power, holding that the
adoption by Congress of a comprehensive scheme for regulation of
aliens left no scope for state action of any kind in this area. In establishing the supremacy of federal power over aliens, Justice Black stressed
at some length the paramount interests of the national government in
securing non-discriminatory treatment for foreign nationals. Referring
to state alien registration acts, he said: "Laws imposing such burdens
are not mere census requirements, and even though they may be immediately associated with the accomplishment of a local purpose, they
provoke questions in the :field of international affairs." On the point
he concluded, "Consequently the regulation of aliens is so intimately
blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject,
'the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State,
in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 79, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941). Some of these are
cited in a note, 29 GEORGETOWN L.J. 755 at 767 (1941).
Davidowitz v. Hines, (D.C. Pa. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 470.
S.Ct. 399 (1941).
provisions, as they were in 1940, may be cited as 54 Stat. L. 673
(1940), as amended, 66 Stat. L. 223 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §§1301 to 1306.
9

10 312 U.S. 52, 61
11 The registration
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though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield
to it.' "12
In few of the cases resolving asserted con8.icts between state and
federal power is the decision based upon the single ground of exclusive federal power, or federal pre-emption, or actual repugnancy of
state to federal policy. Justice Black went on to indicate his belief that
the primary test must be whether the Pennsylvania law obstructed or
hindered the full accomplishment of congressional purposes. As to this
he found con8.ict between the state and federal acts. The federal act
provided for a single registration of aliens fourteen years of age and
over, detailed information specified by the act, :finger-printing of registrants, and secrecy of the federal :6les which could be made available
only upon approval of the attorney-general. There was at that time no
requirement that the alien carry a card, and failure to register was
punishable only if shown to be willful. It was noted that bills providing for the carrying of cards had been frequently introduced without
success in Congress.13 Without deciding whether or not registration
of aliens was a subject admitting of only a single system of registration,
Justice Black read the text and the legislative history of the Alien Registration Act as evidencing a congressional purpose to "protect the
personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national
registration system, and to leave them free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not only affect
our international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty
which the law has intended guarding against."14
Justice Stone, with whom concurred Chief Justice Hughes and
Justice McReynolds, dissented. He argued that aliens once admitted
to the country become subject to the police powers of the state and that
since federal power here is not exclusive the Pennsylvania law was
clearly valid in the abse_nce of congressional legislation. Moving to meet
the majority holding, Justice Stone said that states should be precluded
from acting not on the basis of vague conceptions of occupancy of the
field but only upon a showing of a "direct and positive" repugnancy
between state and federal acts.15 No such con8.ict was found to exist,
since compliance with the state law did not preclude or hinder compliance with the act of Congress. Evidence of congressional intent to
withdraw power over aliens from the states was considered to be totally
12Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 66, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941).
13 For examples of congressional legislation of this type and discussion leading to
rejection or abandonment, see 72 CoNc. RBc. 3886 (1930).
14 312 U.S. 52 at 74, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941).
15 This was the expression of the test employed in the case of Sinnot v. Davenport,
22 How. (63 U.S.) 227 (1859).
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lacking. Rather, Congress must be presumed to have known of the
numerous state statutes treating the identical subject matter when it
passed the federal act.16 The fact that both state and federal laws may
have an impact on the alien was declared to be the result simply of the
dual sovereignty to which the alien, like the citizen, is subject. Analogies were drawn to concurrent powers of state and federal governments
in the fields of taxation and of licensing. As supporting his conclusion
Justice Stone cited, inter alia, the case of Gilbert v. Minnesota, which
was not mentioned in the opinion of the Court but had been urged as
controlling in the appellants' brief.
Early in 1952 the Michigan Trucks Act, formally entitled the
"Michigan Communist Control Law," came into effect.17 An immediate challenge to the act was issued in the form of a bill seeking an
injunction to restrain enforcement of certain sections of the act and an
adjudication that these sections were unconstitutional. The bill was
brought by the Communist Party of Michigan and its secretary, William Albertson. A temporary restraining order was issued against enforcement of the act while a three-judge court was deciding on the
merits of the petition for injunction. Two sections of the Michigan act
were considered.18 One of these requires registration by communists
with the State Police under oath and the furnishing of information
with respect to the purpose of the registrant's presence within the state,
features of identification, and other data. The same section further
requires registration by officers of the Communist Party and disclosure
by them of the location of offices and meeting places, names of members, financial statements, and the like. Criminal penalties are prescribed for failure to comply with these requirements. The other section
of the act against which relief was sought provides that the name of
any communist or Communist Party nominee shall not be printed on
any ballot used in any primary or general election in the state or political
subdivision thereof.
Plaintiff's initial contention was that these sections of the act were
invalid on the ground that the Internal Security Act of 195019 had
16 Apparently Congress did have such knowledge. See Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary on H.R. 5138, 76th Cong., 3d sess.
(1940).
11 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1953) §§28.243(II)-28.243(22).
18 The sections challenged were §§5(a) and 7. Section 4 was also challenged :in
Albertson's bill. It contains a defutltion of "communist front organization" for purposes of
the act. Judge Simons dismissed the bill as to this section on the ground that no "communist front organizations" were claiming or shown to be parties to the suit. Albertson
concededly sued in his own right and on behalf of the Communist Party itself and hence
was not in a position to seek relief against §4.
10 64 Stat. L. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §781 et seq. For a complete analysis of
the act see note, 51 CoL. L. REV. 606 (1951).
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"occupied the field" to the exclusion of any exertion of state power.
In an opinion by Chief Circuit Judge Simons, the court rejected this
and other of plaintiff's contentions and upheld the sections of the
Trucks Act which had been called in question. 20 Judge Simons began
by pointing to language in Hines v. Davidowitz in which the Supreme
Court had emphasized that no single test provides an exclusive constitutional yardstick by which to reconcile competing state and federal
claims of authority. Judge Simons read the cases cited by plaintiff as
establishing the following principles:

"... (1) that where Congress enters a field of regulation, but
does not occupy it entirely, the state is not precluded from legislating therein in matters of purely state concern, (2) that exclusion of the exercise of state authority is to be enforced only where
state action conflicts, or is likely to conflict, with federal authority
and does not apply where state legislation is complementary to
the purpose and objectives of federal action ...."21
Judge Simons held that the Trucks Act provisions, tested by these
principles, were not invalidated by the Internal Security Act since
there was no conflict between provisions of the two acts. Rather, the
statutes were viewed as complementary to each other, one on the
national and the other on the local level. The states were considered
to have an abundant interest in regulating state and local elections, and
in protecting their own governments from violent overthrow and their
industrial plants from sabotage. As a final point in support of his holdings, Judge Simons referred to the text and legislative history of the
federal act as indicating that Congress did not propose to deal exclusively with the subject matter.
District Judge Levin dissented. He thought that the registration
provisions of the Trucks Act invaded a field which had been preempted by Congress when it enacted the registration provisions of the
Internal Security Act. Congress, in passing the act, had evidenced
particular concern for the welfare of the states in its declared purpose to
"guarantee to each State a republican form of government" and had
made a further finding to the effect that communism is a world-wide
rather than a local problem. 22 Judge Levin drew principal support from
20 Albertson

v. Millard, (D.C. Mich. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 635.

21 Id. at 640-641.
22 Under the section

entitled "Congressional finding of necessity" [64 Stat. L. 987
(1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §781] it was found by Congress that: "There exists a
world Communist movement which, in its origins, its development, and its present practice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement. ,• . ." As a result of this and a number of
other findings, it was concluded that: ''The Communist organization in the United States •••
and the nature and control of the world Communist movement itself • . • make it necessary
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one of the tests enunciated in Hines 11. Davidowitz, namely, whether
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." The Michigan
act was viewed as involving state law enforcement officers in evaluations of Soviet foreign policy with the attendant possibility of serious
embarrassment to the federal government in sensitive areas of international affairs. Conceding that there was no outright conB.ict in the
purposes of the registration provisions of state and federal acts, Judge
Levin found further possibility of interference with congressional
purposes in the wide differences between the two laws in the matter
of procedure. In reasoning which was again suggestive of Justice
Black's phrases in Hines 11. Davidowitz, he observed that the federal
act demonstrates far greater solicitude for individual liberties in many
respects than does the Michigan statute. He concluded, "The Congressional purpose manifested in the safeguards erected in the McCarran [Internal Security] Act could be thwarted and ultimately rendered
meaningless were acts like the Michigan Act here in question put into
operation in each or any of the forty-eight states." In the second
portion of his opinion Judge Levin expressed the further belief that
the Michigan act did not meet the standard of due process.
From the decision of this district court in Albertson v. Millard23
an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion
the Supreme Court remanded with directions to vacate the restraining
order and to hold the proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pending construction of the statute by the state courts. 24 The Court invoked
familiar doctrine to the effect that state statutes will not be passed upon
if there exist terms and provisions of doubtful meaning as yet unclarified in the state courts. An opportunity for such clarification was seen
to exist in a bill pending in the circuit court for Wayne County which
sought a declaratory judgment that the act was unconstitutional.
Justice Black dissented. Justice Douglas dissented in a brief opinion
in which he asserted that the case was ripe for decision on the two
points presented, namely, whether Michigan could require the Communist Party of Michigan and its secretary to register, and whether
Michigan could forbid the names of communists or Communist
Party nominees from appearing on the ballot in state and local electhat Congress, in order to provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of
the United States as an independent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican
form of government, enact appropriate legislation. • • ."
23
24

(D.C. Mich. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 635.
345 U.S. 242, 73 S.Ct. 600 (1953).
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tions. In the view of Justice Douglas no decision of a Michigan court
could make the issues more specific.
Acting pursuant to a provision of its penal code which defines
sedition and makes it a felony,2 5 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
in 1952 convicted Steve Nelson, chairman of the Communist Party
of Western Pennsylvania. Nelson filed motions for a new trial and in
arrest of judgment, urging that the Smith and McCarran Acts preempted the :field and precluded enforcement of the Pennsylvania
Sedition Act. The Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County
rejected this contention on the basis that state legislation is invalid only
when the federal government's jurisdiction over the subject matter is
exclusive or where its power is supreme and the federal government has
expressly or by necessary implication indicated its intention of superseding state action. The McCarran Act was read as authorizing rather
than precluding state action, particularly in the provision that: "The
foregoing provisions of this title shall be construed as being in addition
to and not in modification of existing criminal statutes."26 The court
concluded that the case was properly to be categorized as one of "concurrent jurisdiction" resulting from the fact of dual sovereignty, citing
United States v. Lanza21 and Westfall v. United States, 28 which held
that the same acts might be criminal under both state and federal law.
On appeal by the defendant to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the
conviction was affirmed per curiam on the opinion by Judge Montgomery of the Court of Quarter Sessions.29
On review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, the
judgment of the superior court was reversed. 30 Judge Jones, for the
court, held that the Smith Act precluded Pennsylvania from prosecuting
members of the Communist Party under its own sedition law. He
rested his decision on two principal grounds. First, the case was considered to be one of federal pre-emption on the basis that where both
state and federal government have legislated in a field of paramount
importance to the latter, the federal legislation must be taken to supersede that of the state. Judge Jones cited Hines v. Davidowitz for this
25Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) tit. 18, §4207.
26 64 Stat. L. 1003 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §796.
27260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141 (1922). This is perhaps the leading case on concurrent jurisdiction of dual sovereignties. It is customarily distinguished in decisions rejecting the notion of concurrent jurisdiction on the ground that it involved the 18th Amendment to the Constitution which expressly authorized concurrent jurisdiction in the enforcement of Prohibition.
2s274 U.S. 256, 47 S.Ct. 629 (1927).
29 Commonwealth v. Nelson, 172 Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. (2d) 431 (1952).
so Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954), rehearing den.
April 27, 1954.
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proposition and, in establishing the character of the federal interest as
paramount, declared that no federal interest could be more dominant
than the maintenance of the security of the federal government itself.
The cases cited in the superior court opinion to support the principle
of "concurrent jurisdiction" were distinguished on the basis that there
the state was properly punishing for a separate offense to its own
dignity whereas here Pennsylvania sought to punish Nelson for sedition against the United States. Possible implications from this statement to the effect that a state might not be precluded from punishing
sedition against its own government were foreclosed by Judge Jones'
further statement that it would be difficult to conceive of acts of sedition against a state that were not also acts of sedition against the federal
government-"the Union of the 48 component states." Moreover, the
duty of suppressing sedition against a state government is placed
squarely upon the federal government by article IV, section 4 of the
Constitution which charges the federal government to guarantee "to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." Congress undertook this duty when, in the revised Smith Act of 1948, it
outlawed the attempted overthrow "of the government of the United
States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession
thereof. . . . "31 Judge Jones concluded, "Federal pre-emption could
hardly be more clearly indicated."32
The second principle on which the decision rests is essentially the
test employed in Hines v. Davidowitz and again by Judge Levin dissenting in Albertson v. Millard. The test is whether or not the state act
gives promise of hindering or obstructing congressional purposes. On
this ground Judge Jones distinguished Gilbert v. Minnesota. Conceding that a state retains the power to punish breaches of the peace, this
does not carry with it the right to "conflict or irtterfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law." Such interference was found in the
disparity of sentences prescribed for the same offense by the federal
and Pennsylvania acts.33 Judge Jones observed, "This disparity could
not help but confuse and hinder the attack on sedition, which calls for
uniform action on a national basis." There is a very strong suggestion
3118 U.S.C. (1952) §2385. This language was substituted in the 1948 revision for
the former wording: "any government in the United States. • ••" The change does not
appear to be one of substance.
32 377 Pa. 58 at 70, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954).
33 The Smith Act provides a penalty of not more than $5000 fine or six years imprisonment, or both, for "seditious conspiracy" [18 U.S.C. (1952) §2384] and a fine of not
more than $10,000 or ten years imprisonment, or both, for willfully advocating the overthrow of the government of the United States, state or political subdivision [18 U.S.C.
(1952) §2385]. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the defendant Nelson had received a
twenty-year sentence.
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here of the Cooley doctrine of one uniform system of regulation which
has long been applied in cases arising under the commerce clause,34
but the point was not stressed. In the final paragraph of his opinion,
Judge Jones expressed his strong disapproval of the provision of the
Pennsylvania law permitting indictment upon information of a private
individual. Pointing to the opportunities thus afforded for the venting
of personal spite, he stated his view that defense of the nation by law
should be a public and not a private undertaking, and that were the
task accomplished by the central administration of the federal government individual rights freely to criticize the government might better
be maintained. In a brief concurring opinion Chief Justice Stem
stressed the importance of prosecuting sedition, a crime against the
nation, in the federal courts. He indicated his belief that the question
would be finally determined by the United States Supreme Court.
That Court has in fact recently agreed to review the Pennsylvania
court's decision. 35
Judge Bell entered a lengthy and vigorous dissent. He contended
that since the power of the federal government to punish sedition is
concededly not exclusive, federal supersedure can occur only where
there is a direct and positive conflict between state and federal acts.
In adopting the repugnancy test he echoed the language of Justice Stone,
dissenting in the Hines case, and cited many of the same decisions.
Having established his criterion, Judge Bell argued that there was no
conflict between the two acts, and that neither the text of the federal
statute nor the circumstances of its enactment gave the slightest indication that Congress in passing the Smith Act intended to take complete
control of the field. In support of this conclusion, he set out a number
of facts known to Congress at the time of the passage of the revised
Smith Act in 1948 which he considered relevant in ascertaining congressional intent with respect to pre-emption. Among these facts, he
cited the large number of state treason and sedition laws known by
Congress to be in effect at that time, and the further fact, also known
to Congress, of demonstrated inability on the part of the federal government acting alone to cope with the problem of domestic Communism.
In the same connection, Judge Bell cited that section of Title 18 of the
United States Code which provides: "Nothing in this title shall be
held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several
34 The rule enunciated in the leading case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of
Philadelphia, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851), will be considered at more length below.
35 Certiorari was granted in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 75 S.Ct. 58
(October 14, 1954). The Solicitor General was invited to file a brief presenting the view
of the government.
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States under the laws thereof." 36 Finally, he introduced into his
opinion a portion of a letter written by Congressman Smith, author
of the Smith Act, to the Attorney-General of Pennsylvania in which
the writer stated that Congress had never intended to oust the concurrent jurisdiction of states in prosecuting for subversive activities
and that: "It would be a severe handicap to the successful stamping
out of subversive activities if no state authority were permitted to assist
in the elimination of this evil, or to protect its own sovereignty."37
In his review of the decisions Judge Bell urged that the principles
enunciated in Gilbert v. Minnesota should be controlling. He read
the decision in Hines v. Davidowitz as resting on the premise that state
alien registration acts would be likely to involve the nation in international controversies and might even lead to ,var. In his view these
considerations can have no force where state treason or sedition laws
are concerned. In conclusion, stress was laid by Judge Bell on the
decisions upholding the concurrent jurisdiction of states and the federal
government to punish for offenses against their respective sovereignties,
and upon decisions in the field of labor-management relations and the
commerce clause in which the exercise of state power has been upheld.

II
If the decisions which have been summarized above are to be useful
in predicting the course of future decisions in the field, it is necessary to
isolate and classify the ideas which appear in the opinions. It has
already been observed that questions of federal supremacy and federal
pre-emption are seldom decided on a single ground. It can be further
observed that in deciding these questions courts are not very precise in
marking off the limits of the various grounds for decision. Terms like
"exclusive federal power" or " occupancy of the field" tend to be used
in a variety of senses. In the above summary of the decisions a certain
amount of systematization has of necessity been introduced. What
follows is an attempt at even further systematization in the interests of
determining just what considerations are likely to move a court one
way or the other in testing state anti-subversive legislation against
federal power and congressional purposes. The following ideas and
assumptions are offered for further examination as underlying the
decisions which have been reviewed.
36 18 U.S.C. (1952) §3231. This is a general provision, of course, having reference
to all of Title 18, and appears in the chapter dealing with the jurisdiction and venue of
district courts.
37 377 Pa. 58 at 90-91, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954).
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A. Exclusive Federal Power. It is settled by a long line of decisions, chiefly concerned with regulation of commerce, that in areas
where federal power is exclusive, states may not act within the area
at all even though Congress has not exercised its power.38 In the area
of anti-subversive legislation the decisions indicate little disposition to
hold that federal power is exclusive. In part this may be the result of
the fact that Congress has actually made wide use of its powers, and
questions which would have been presented had such powers lain dormant need not be considered. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Gilbert
v. Minnesota, was of the opinion that federal power over recruiting
for the armed forces was exclusive, but he went on to point to the
Federal Espionage Act of 1917 as precluding legislation by the states.
In cases involving the regulation of aliens as a class by the states there
are decisions to the effect that the powers of the federal government
are exclusive.39 Insofar as the state regulations have encroached upon
federal powers over immigration, naturalization, or foreign commerce,
the decisions seem eminently sound. Justice Black in the Hines case,
however, was unwilling .to hold that the federal power to compel registration of aliens was exclusive,40 and Chief Justice Stone, in dissent,
thought that such regulations were very clearly within the police powers
of the state. Even the decision in Commonwealth v. Nelson, which
recognizes the federal government's paramount interest in protecting
national and state governments from violent overthrow, apparently
rejects the view that this is an exclusive prerogative of the national
government which must be denied to states even where Congress has
not acted.
B. Uniform National System of Regulation. Ever since the
decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia41
the Supreme Court has observed a distinction in cases arising under
38 The rule was implied m the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824) and was subsequently applied by Marshall in Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 (1827) and m McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
(17 U.S.) 316 (1819).
39For example, see Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. (15 U.S.) 259 (1817) (naturalization); Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) and Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 5 S.Ct. 247 (1884) (power over foreign co=erce); Chy
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 13 S.Ct. 1016 (1893) (power to conduct foreign relations).
40 Despite two decisions, one in a federal district court and the other in the California
Supreme Court, which struck down state alien registration acts on the sole ground that
such acts constituted an invasion of the powers of the federal government. See Arrowsmith
v. Voorhies, (D.C. Mich. 1931) 55 F. (2d) 310, and Ex parte Ah Cue, 101 Cal. 197, 35
P. 556 (1894). These statutes do appear, however, to have gone considerably beyond the
Pennsylvania act in regulating the alien.
41 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851).
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the commerce clause between regulations of subject matter which
demands a uniform national system of regulation and subject matter in
which local diversity can be permitted. In cases falling into the former
category, the tendency has been to hold that the states are precluded
from acting at all; in cases of the latter class, state regulations have
generally been upheld until Congress has manifested its intent to
regulate in the field, or to leave it free from all regulation. This doctrine is potentially of great force in the area of anti-subversive legislation.
A strong argument can be made that the problem of subversion is a
national one which must be handled, if at all, on a national basis. Considerations of international politics and of foreign policy can be
adduced to reinforce the argument. Only the federal government, it
may be urged, is in a position to coordinate the related problems of the
Cold War and internal subversion. There is more than a hint of this
type of thinking in the decisions which have been reviewed, and Judge
Levin, dissenting in Albertson v. Millard, pointed to the congressional
finding in the Internal Security Act that communism was a world-wide
rather than a local problem Yet it cannot be said that the rule of the
Cooley case has been clearly articulated as a major ground for decision
in any of the opinions which have been examined.

C. Congressional Action in an Area of Supreme Federal Power
and Interest. It is in this situation that doctrines of federal pre-emption
or occupancy of the :field are typically and properly applied. Within
the area, application of the doctrines seems to involve a balancing process. Where federal supremacy is very clear, and the interests of the
national government undeniably paramount, it will require very little
in the way of legislation by Congress to spell exclusion from the :field
for the states. It is clear that in such cases an actual repugnance or
conflict between state and federal statutes has not been required, nor
have the courts demanded any clear expression of congressional intent
to pre-empt the :field. Hines v. Davidoivitz, in fact, has since been
interpreted as creating a presumption of congressional intent to pre-empt
the :field in areas of supreme national importance.42 Correspondingly,
however, where the national interest appears less paramount a court
may insist upon more evidence of congressional intent to oust state
power. There is, of course, no agreed upon set of rules for determining
when the national interest is of this stature, and a point of conflict
running through the decisions is the degree to which the national
interest actually is supreme. A judge's view on this point is likely to
42 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146 (1947),
and Braden, "Umpire to the Federal System," 10 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 27 (1942).
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have a profound influence on the way he reads the statutes for indicia
of congressional intent.
A second problem in cases presenting the question of whether Congress has occupied the field is the matter of defining the "field." Judge
Simons in Albertson v. Millard conceded that Congress had entered
the field, but he did not believe that Congress had occupied it so fully
that no scope for state action remained. In this connection it is of
particular significance to examine the extent to which Congress has
acted to regulate the subject matter in question. From the cases which
have been decided under the commerce clause it may be deduced as a
fairly safe principle that where Congress has enacted a detailed and
comprehensive system of regulation there is greater likelihood that it
will be held to have occupied the field than where it has touched only
lightly on the subject.43 There is ample scope for the application of
this idea in the area of anti-subversive legislation. In Hines v. Davidowitz Justice Black made the point that Congress has enacted a detailed
body of rules respecting alien registration and had further made a real
effort to harmonize these rules with other federal statutes in the same
general area so as to ensure uniform and comprehensive treatment of the
subject.

D. Repugnancy or ConfUct Between State and Federal Acts.
One of the few principles which can be stated with assurance in the
broad area of federal supersedure is that where there is a "direct and
positive conllict" between a state law and a federal act the state law
cannot stand.44 This is the so-called "repugnancy" or "conflict" test,
and it has been applied in decisions covering a very broad range of
subject matter. Typically the test is asserted as controlling and then
rejected as not applicable to the facts by a judge who believes that a
state act should be upheld. 46 Reasoning of this kind was employed by
Judge Simons in Albertson v. Millard and by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Commonwealth v. Nelson. It was also used by the dissenting
judges in Hines v. Davidowitz and by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the Nelson case. Parenthetically it may be remarked that
43 Compare Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 57 S.Ct. 842 (1937) and Savage
v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S.Ct. 715 (1912) with Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315
U.S. 148, 62 S.Ct. 491 (1942) and McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 33 S.Ct. 431
(1913). ·
44 Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. (63 U.S.) 227 (1859), contains the classic statement of the test, including the "direct and positive conffict'' clause. See also Southern Ry.
Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 32 S.Ct. 140 (1912). In general see note, 60 HARv. L. REv.
262 (1946), and particularly the cases cited at pp. 263-264.
45 That this is true also in commerce clause decisions, see note, 60 HARv. L. REv.
262 at 263, n. 10 (1946).
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Chief Justice Stone, who urged the test as controlling in the Hines
case, has on other occasions made plain his conviction that, absent
exclusive federal power, an actual conllict is the only basis on which
state legislation may properly be held to have been superseded. 46 The
views of a number of other Supreme Court justices also have become
fairly well crystallized on this question. 47
There are, however, many possible variations of the repugnancy
test. The easiest case is one where there is such a direct conflict that
compliance with one statute means defiance of the other.48 In such a
case the test is essentially objective. It is a matter simply of comparing
the texts of the state and federal acts in question. A variant which
introduces the subjective element of congressional intent is the test
used in the Hines case by Justice Black. As has been indicated, he
thought that the Pennsylvania act must fall if it obstructed or hindered
the full accomplishment of congressional purposes, and this formulation was employed again by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Com11wnwealth 11. Nelson. The test in this form is of peculiar importance
in decisions involving anti-subversive legislation since it furnishes a
ground for saying that since Congress has evinced a greater regard for
individual rights than has the state legislature ( which has commonly
been the case), Congress must have intended that the safeguards it
wrote into its own act should not be impaired by state legislation which
omits comparable safeguards. This type of thinking is an important
part of the rationale both in the Hines case and in Com111,0nwealth 11.
Nelson. It is clear that while such a test retains an element of the
"conllict" idea, it has moved a very great distance from the strict statement of that doctrine and understandably has not met with the approval
of judges like Chief Justice Stone or Judge Simons.
·
E. Congressional Intent to Supersede State Action. It has already
been indicated that judges differ sharply in their views as to how
much and what kind of evidence of congressional intent to supersede
legislation by the states will be necesary in order to invalidate a state
law. A presumption of such intent requiring little if any support
46 See his dissenting opinions in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 62
S.Ct. 491 (1942) and Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945).
47 In the commerce field, Justice Black is of the view that where Congress has not
acted an actual discrimination against interstate commerce is necessary. Where Congress
has acted, Justice Black's opinion in the Hines case provides an illustration of his thinking,
at least where he believes that the matter is of paramount concern to the national government. In several majority and dissenting opinions Justice Frankfurter has evinced a special
concern for the administrative realities of the asserted conflict, and has inquired whether
competing agencies can as a practical matter reconcile their respective spheres of regulation.
48 Judge Hutcheson in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, (5th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d)
227 at 232.
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from text or legislative history will be indulged in cases of direct
conllict between state and federal laws, and by some judges in cases
of inconsistency or disparity of provisions between the statutes if the
national interest is thought to be of overriding importance. There can
be no serious doubt that Congress could preclude the states from enacting anti-subversive legislation and could nullify many existing state
laws if it chose to include in its statutes an unequivocal statement of its
intent to assert exclusive control over the :field. Moreover since Congress may remove constitutional obstacles to legislation by the states in
areas of exclusive federal concern,49 it can certainly grant to the states
statutory authorization to combat subversion which will be honored
by the courts. But it is apparent from the decisions that it has done
neither, and that judges of either persuasion can cite portions of congressional acts to support their position and then either conclude that
no conllict exists or rule on the basis of an obstruction to "congressional
purposes." The legislative history is unsatisfactory on the point,50 and
evidence such as that adduced by Judge Bell of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in the form of a letter from Congressman Smith would
not be accepted as proper under usual principles of statutory interpretation.151 Much must be made of what Congress "knew" at the time,
and again on the point it can be said both that Congress knew of the
many state anti-subversive laws then in effect and that it recognized
that subversion was a problem of national scope best dealt with at the
national level. Congressional intent, it must be concluded, has been
an unsatisfactory guide for decision, much having been presumed
or inferred which may or may not be warranted in actual fact.
F. Dominant Interest and Responsibility. No judge would suggest that subversion is not a problem of vital concern to the federal
government, but the decisions reflect a wide difference of opinion as
to whether it is of such vital and overriding concern that it has ceased
to become a legitimate subject for legislation by the states. The judges
who believe that the national interest is primary to the exclusion of the
states would not of course leave the states unprotected. They assert
that it is the responsibility and duty of the federal government under
article IV, section 4 of the Constitution to shield the state as well as
the federal government from forcible overthrow. That section of the
Constitution states:
49 Such is the teaching of In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 11 S.Ct. 865 (1891), which
was followed by cases like Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 56 S.Ct. 532 (1936).
50 Legislative history will be discussed more fully below.
151 SOTHBRLAND, STATUTBS AND STATUTORY CoNSTRucnoN, 3d ed., Horack, 504
(1943).
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"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each
of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature,
or of the Executive ( when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence."

As has been seen it is fairly common to construct an argument on the
basis of the federal duty to guarantee to states a republican form of
government, but the second part of the section appears to suggest an
argument on the other side. Can it not be fairly implied from that
language that "domestic violence" is to be the concern of $e states
unless they have made application for the intervention of the federal
government? Perhaps it could be shown that the intent of the framers
cannot be said to have included subversion in the sense of incitement
to violent overthrow. In any event, the argument has not been made.
The opinion of Judge Jones in Commonwealth 11. Nelson provides a
good example of the view that advocacy of the destruction of state governments is an immediate threat to the safety and existence of the
national government itself which is, after all, a "Union of the 48 component states." If the decision in that case is to be confined to its facts,
of course, it is significant that Nelson was charged only with sedition
against the United States. At the same time assertions that there remains at least a residuum of state interest which justifies state legislation
are strongly pressed. In Gilbert v. Minnesota the majority said that
Minnesota possessed a real interest in ensuring the success of federal
recruiting since her citizens were being called upon to serve. Similarly,
Justice Stone, dissenting in the Hines case, thought that Pennsylvania's
Alien Registration Act was a wholly appropriate exercise of the police
power which afforded to the state "a convenient method of ascertaining
the number and whereabouts of aliens within the state, which it is
entitled to know, and a means of their identification."52 Judge Bell
dissenting in the Nelson case was particularly emphatic in asserting
that states must be permitted to defend their own governments since,
in his view, the federal government had shown its inability to cope
with the problem. In the absence of clearer indications of congressional
intent and policy than have so far been forthcoming, it may be expected that the question as to what extent federal interests and responsibilities dominate the field will be a crucial one.
G. Double Punishment and Dual Sovereignty.
The ideas of
double punishment and dual sovereignty are closely related in the
52

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 75, 61 S.Ct. 399 (1941).
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decisions which have been reviewed. Commonwealth v. Nelson provides the best vehicle for exploration of the relationship between these
ideas. The notion that individuals might be punished twice for the
same acts if the state legislation were allowed to stand was stressed in
the majority opinion by Judge Jones. Judge Jones was also impressed
with the fact of wide disparity in the punishments prescribed in state
and federal laws. The point appears to have been made for two reasons.
First, it bears upon congressiqnal intent since Congress presumably
would not wish further and more stringent penalties to be added to
the ones it has prescribed and, second, it indicates the capacity of state
acts for hindering and obstructing the efforts of the federal government
to deal with the problem. Judge Bell in his dissent read the opinion
of the majority as resting in part upon an objection of double jeopardy
in the constitutional sense. While it is difficult to see how the majority
opinion could be thus construed, Judge Bell is certainly on firm ground
when he demonstrates that the same acts constituting an offense
against both state and federal law may be punished by either without
valid constitutional objection. 53 As the two opinions very clearly show,
the really ultimate issue is that of dual sovereignty. The majority willingly accept the decisions supporting the concurrent jurisdiction of dual
sovereigns to punish for the same acts. The difficulty with the doctrine,
in the view of Judge Jones, is that the acts of Nelson constituted an
offense against the United States alone. The same division of opinion
occurs in the other decisions as well: if these are offenses against dual
sovereigns, each may punish; if they are offenses only against the federal government, the federal government alone should punish. For
principles controlling the decision as to how many sovereigns are properly involved, one is then pushed back still further to considerations
of dominant interest and responsibility.

H. Belief as to the Unwisdom or Unconstitutionality of the State
Act on Other Grounds. In this as in related fields where questions
of federal pre-emption arise, it is obvious from a reading of the opinions
that a judge's determination on the issue of pre-emption is profoundly
influenced by his view as to the wisdom or the constitutionality on other
grounds of the state act in question. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in
Gilbert v. 1.\11.innesota, entertained grave doubts as to whether the Minnesota statute met the standards of due process. Judge Levin in his
dissent in Albertson v. Millard had similar doubts which he expressed
53 Judge Bell cites a number of the usual decisions including United States v. Lanza,
260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141 (1922); Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 47 S.Ct.
629 (1927); and Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920).
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at some length. Stem disapproval of the state laws, moreover, stands
out all through the majority opinions in Hines v. Davidowitz and
Commonwealth 11. Nelson. Since judges, like many other informed
persons, differ sharply on the question of how best to meet the problem
of internal subversion, it may be confidently predicted that considerations of this kind will continue to influence the decisions of these cases.

III
A brief examination of the decisions and doctrine in the 6.elds of
regulation of commerce and labor-management relations is appropriate,
since there are many more decisions bearing on the question of federal
supremacy and pre-emption in these 6.elds than in the area of antisubversive legislation. To facilitate prediction, particular attention will
be paid to what appear to be the most recent trends in Supreme Court
thinking.
Substantially all of the ideas examined in the preceding section
appear repeatedly in the decisions involving the commerce clause of the
Constitution and congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of
the power which that clause confers. State statutes have been invalidated on the ground that they invaded an area of exclusive federal
power, whether Congress has acted or not, and also on the ground that
the subject matter of the regulations by its very nature demanded
uniform national legislation. 54 Tpe test of direct conflict between the
provisions of state and federal acts has been widely conceded as appropriate, but less widely used in actually striking down state legislation.
This objective, textual conflicts test has often been urged as the only
valid criterion in the absence of exclusive federal power or facts calling
for an application of the rule of the Cooley case. Other judges have
believed that conflict with congressional purposes and policy is all that
is required. Beyond this, in the area of so-called "occupation of the
6.eld," there are decisions in accord with Hines v. Davidowitz which
go on the ground that in certain areas of primary national concern the
fact of congressional action in itself raises a presumption that Congress
intended to occupy the entire 6.eld to the exclusion of the states. As
in that case, there are strenuous dissents from such an approach. A
second criterion which has been used in a number of decisions is the
extent to which Congress has regulated in the area. Comprehensive
systems of regulation which have been actually implemented are more
54 See notes 38, 39 and 41 supra. See also Braden, "Umpire to the Federal System,"
10 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 27 (1942), note, 60 HA:av. L. RBv. 262 (1946).
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likely to displace state laws than are congressional acts which only skirt
the fringes of the subject matter.55
While the commerce clause has largely replaced the due process
clause as the constitutional weapon in striking down state economic
legislation,56 and the decisions, broadly speaking, have followed the
trend of recent years toward increasing the powers of the federal government at the expense of the states, the rules and doctrines with respect to reconciliation of state and federal power have by no means
crystallized in favor of the federal government. An examination of
three comparatively recent commerce clause decisions should make this
clear. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 51 the question was whether
Congress by the enactment of the United States Warehouse Act had
precluded Illinois from regulating warehouses under its Public Utilities
and Grain Warehouse Acts. There was language in the federal act
which unequivocally expressed the intent of Congress to eliminate dual
regulation of warehouses subject to the act. Justice Douglas, for the
Court, held that Congress had gone further than to make the federal
act override state law in the event of conflict and that accordingly as to
all matters regulated by the federal law any state regulation was wholly
displaced. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter stated, "... due regard for
our federalism, in its practical operation, favors survival of the reserved
authority of a State over matters that are the intimate concern of the
State unless Congress has clearly swept the boards of all State authority,
or the State's claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has
ordered."58 Justice Frankfurter, of course, read the congressional intent
differently from the majority of the Court. In California v. Zook59
the Supreme Court had before it a California statute which made it
unlawful to sell or arrange for transportation over the public highways
of the state unless the transporting carrier had a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Federal Motor Carrier Act contained a provision which was substantially identical with respect to
carriers in interstate commerce. Justice Murphy, for the majority, held
that the California statute was not rendered invalid by the Federal
Motor Carrier Act. The majority's reasoning was that the test must
be whether the state act conflicts with national policy and whether
Congress intended its regulations to be exclusive. On the latter point
Justice Murphy stated that congressional intent to displace state laws
55 Cases are cited in
56 Braden, "Umpire

note 43 supra.
to the Federal System," 10 _UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 27 (1942).
57 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146 (1947).
5s Id. at 241.
59 336 U.S. 725, 69 S.Ct. 841 (1949).
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must be clearly manifested, and on the former it was held that there
was clearly no conflict in the terms of the statutes and that mere coincidence of provisions did not amount to a forbidden conflict. 60 There
were dissents in the case by Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Douglas and
Jackson. Justice Frankfurter thought that when Congress had prescribed specific sanctions for specific offenses the states were no longer
free to impose additional punishments. He stressed the desirability of
avoiding double punishment even though such punishment might be
constitutionally permissible. 61 Finally, he thought that the aconflict"
test for displacing state power as an exclusive criterion was applicable
only when Congress had chosen to occupy a limited field. Justice Burton, with whom concurred Justices Douglas and Jackson, dissented at
length principally on the basis that Congress intended to assert exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter. He also found conflicts between the provisions of the state and federal acts.
In Lloyd A. Fry Roo-fing Co. v. W ood62 a majority of the Supreme
Court applied the "conflicts" test to an Arkansas statute requiring permits of "contract carriers" which were in this case engaged in interstate
commerce. Justice Black in the majority opinion declared that no
showing had been made of conflict between the Arkansas law and the
Federal Motor Carrier Act or regulations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission issued thereunder. The Arkansas act, moreover, required
its commission to reconcile state regulation with the regulation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Justice Douglas dissented and was
joined by Justices Burton and Minton and Chief Justice Vinson. He
contended simply that Congress had pre-empted the field, citing, inter
alia, Hines v. Davidowitz and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
Perhaps the best that can be done by way of rationalizing the commerce clause decisions is to view the entire process as one of balancing
a number of conflicting considerations which impress themselves upon
different justices with varying force. While similarities with the decisions respecting anti-subversive legislation are striking, and while Hines
60 This reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the oft-quoted statement of Justice
Holmes: "When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is
as ineffective as opposition, and a State law is not to be declared a help because it attempts
to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go." Charleston & Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville
Co., 237 U.S. 597 at 604, 35 S.Ct. 715 (1915).
61 An early formulation of this notion is that of Justice Washington in Houston v.
Moore, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 1 at 23 (1820), where in speaking of concurrent state and
federal legislation he observed: "If the one imposes a certain punishment, for a certain
offence, the presumption is, that this was deemed sufficient, and, under all circumstances,
the only proper one. If the other legislature imposes a different punishment, in kind or
degree, I am at a loss to conceive how they can both consist harmoniously together."
62 344 U.S. 157, 73 S.Ct. 204 (1952).
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v. Davidowitz is as frequently cited in these cases as any commerce
clause decision, there are at least two important points of difference.
First, the commerce clause itself, in the absence of any congressional
enactment, stands as a bulwark of f!;!deral power. The policy of the
framers against "Balkanization" of the country through the erection of
tariff barriers and other obstructions to the free How of commerce is well
known and has been re-emphasized in numerous decisions. No constitutional provision bearing upon state laws against subversion is of
anything like this stature. Second, there are in the matter of anti-subversive statutes important civil liberties considerations which do not
intrude so forcibly into the area of regulation of commerce. The presence of these considerations may be of very real significance in determining the views of certain of the justices.
The very considerable body of state and federal legislation pertaining to the relation between labor and management has presented the
Supreme Court with a number of complex questions involving federal
supremacy and pre-emption. 63 These questions have in large measure
been answered without the benefit of clearly expressed congressional
intent respecting the areas sought to be left to the states. 64 The important decisions can be grouped as follows: (I) decisions resting upon
direct conflict between federal and state law or policy; (2) decisions
based upon interference by the states with the exercise of federally-protected rights; (3) decisions involving state prohibition of conduct also
proscribed under federal law; and ( 4) decisions concerning the regulation of practices neither protected nor proscribed under federal law.
Direct conflict between federal and state law or policy has been
found in cases involving state representation proceedings, a state law
prescribing strike votes, and a state law which prohibited strikes in
public utilities.65 In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
63 It is not intended here to treat comprehensively the problems of federalism and
labor-management relations. There is much recent and highly competent commentary in
the field. See Cox, ''Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations," 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297
(1954); Hall, "The Taft-Hartley Act v. State Regulation," 1 J. PuB. L. 97 (1952);
Hays, ''Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
959 (1954); Ratner, "Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations,'' 3 LAB.
L.J. 750 (1952); Rose, ''The Labor Management Relations Act and the State's Power to
Grant Relief," 39 VA. L. REv. 765 (1953).
64 See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767
at 771, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (1947), and International Union, UAW-AFL v. WERB, 336 U.S.
245 at 252, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949). In both of these cases Justice Jackson noted the failure
of Congress to lay down guides for construction of the NLRA in the matter of permissible
scope for state action.
65 This attempt to segregate grounds for decision and fit them into categories of laborrelations cases produces a pattern which is more clear-cut than the decisions warrant.
Actually the decisions uniformly employ two or more of the possible conllict and pre-emption
doctrines.
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Relations Board66 foremen of the steel company had .filed petitions for
representation with the New York State Labor Relations Board at a
time when the National Labor Relations Board had adopted a policy
of denying separate bargaining rights to foremen. Although this policy
was subsequently reversed, the possibilities of conllict in the rulings
of state and federal boards were obvious, and the Supreme Court concluded that New York was without power to entertain these petitions.
The reasoning in Bethlehem Steel was followed in LaCrosse Telephone
Corp. 11. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. 67 That decision
deprived the WERB of jurisdiction to determine a representation
question involving employees who were subject to the NLRA even
though the federal board had not acted. The constitutionality of the
strike vote provision in the Michigan labor mediation law was tested in
International Union, UAW-CIO v. O'Brien. 68 Inspection and comparison of the Michigan law and the NLRA disclosed conllicting provisions, the federal act permitting strikes at a different time and not
requiring the majority authorization which Michigan had prescribed.
There was a further inconsistency in the bargaining units which might
be established under the respective statutes. Accordingly, the state
legislation was held invalid under the commerce clause as conllicting
with federal law and as an infringement on rights safeguarded by
Congress. Disparity between the provisions of the Wisconsin Public
Utility Anti-Strike law and the NLRA, borne out by instances of actual
conllict in the record, likewise resulted in the invalidation of the state
statute. 69
Decisions involving interference by the states with the exercise of
federally-protected rights involve the application of pre-emption doctrines, and, more particularly, of the principle of Hines 11. Davidowitz
that state laws cannot be permitted to stand as obstacles to the full
accomplishment of congressional purposes. In Hill v. Florida10 a state
statute which required the licensing of union business agents and the
filing of union reports as prerequisites to engaging in collective bargaining was held invalid as repugnant to the Wagner Act. The federal law
was thought to establish a policy in favor of free collective bargaining
which the states could not qualify.
·66 330
67 336

U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (1947).
U.S. 18, 69 S.Ct. 379 (1949).
as 339 U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781 (1950).
69 Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. WEBB,
340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359 (1951).
70 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945). In contrast to most of the decisions under
discussion, this case arose prior to the enactment of the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947.
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The question whether state courts retain power to enjoin conduct
also proscribed under federal law is one to which widely divergent
answers have been given. With respect to employer unfair labor practices, the Supreme Court has taken the position that states are powerless to grant administrative remedies in industries under NLRB jurisdiction, 71 but with respect to concerted employee activity of a type
apparently forbidden under the NLRA the Supreme Court has only
recently ruled. 72 In Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers13 an
injunction was sought against picketing which at least arguably fell
within the prohibitions both of Pennsylvania law and of the NLRA.74
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision
granting an injunction and in reversal reasoned that the comprehensive federal remedy provided under the NLRA precluded the states
from affording additional remedies. 76 The Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed on the ground that since Congress had entrusted
primary responsibility for enforcement of the NLRA rules to one specialized body, it must have intended that there should be centralized
and uniform application of those rules. Justice Jackson, for the Court,
observed, "A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are
quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are
different rules of substantive law." 76
The power of the states to regulate employee activity has been
upheld by the Supreme Court where the conduct involved was considered to fall well outside the field of congressional cognizance. It was
said in International Union v. WERB: "This conduct is governable
by the State or it is entirely ungovemed." 77 Earlier, in Allen-Bradley
Plankinton Packing Co. v. WERB, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950) (per curiam).
Examples of the diversity of judicial thinking include State ex rel. Tidewater
Shaver Barge Lines v. Dobson, 195 Ore. 533, 245 P. (2d) 903 (1952); Norris Grain Co.
v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W. (2d) 94 (1950); and Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB,
(9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 848.
73 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953).
74 There could of course be no adjudication as to whether the picketing was actually
unlawful under the NLRA since such an adjudication would have usurped the powers of
the NLRB. It was sufficient to hold that the conduct involved was within the jurisdiction
of the NLRB, and it was also significant that the sections of the Pennsylvania and federal
acts bearing on such conduct were markedly similar, thus heightening the possibility of
conllict between state and federal decisions.
76 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. (2d) 893 (1953). A dissent in the case was filed by Judge Bell.
His approach was similar to the position he took in Commonwealth v. Nelson.
76 346 U.S. 485 at 490-491, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). The Court also rejected the argument that the NLRB was entrusted only with the enforcement of public rights and that
Congress had laid down no rules respecting private rights. This interesting thesis, which
must now he considered academic, is advanced in Rose, "The Labor Management Relations
Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief," 39 VA. L. REv. 765 (1953).
77 336 U.S. 245 at 254, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949).
71
72
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Local v. WERB, 78 the Court had approved an order of the Wisconsin
board requiring a striking union to cease and desist from mass picketing and threats of violence. The union contended that since the employer was subject to the Wagner Act the state board could have no
jurisdiction. Justice Douglas, for a unanimous Court, found that Congress had not made union conduct of the kind involved a subject of
regulation under the federal act, and added that an intent to exclude
states from exercising traditional police powers must be clearly shown.79
The decision in Hines v. Davidowitz was distinguished as involving
legislation which had an impact on the conduct of foreign relations,
an area in which whatever state power might exist was at its lowest
ebb. It was further observed that the federal system of alien registration in the Hines case was a "single integrated and all-embracing" one,
v,,hile in the instant case Congress had deliberately left open an area
for state control. Justice Douglas concluded that the situation was
similar to the common case in which a state moves to prevent breaches
of the peace in connection with labor disputes. This portion of the
Court's reasoning bears a close resemblance to one of the arguments
used in upholding the state statute in Gilbert v. Minnesota. The International Union case developed from an order of the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board directing the cessation of intermittent
work stoppages which it considered to be unlawful under Wisconsin
labor legislation. The order of the Wisconsin board was upheld by the
supreme court of the state, and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed. 80 It was necessary to determine initially that the work stoppages involved were not protected under the NLRA and, conversely,
that the NLRB had not been authorized to forbid them. From these
determinatio:q.s there followed the conclusion that the state police power
had not been superseded by congressional enactment.
In summary it may be stated that doctrines of federal supremacy
and pre-emption have been particularly potent in the labor-management
relations field. This is true for two reasons. First, Congress has written
into law a comprehensive statutory scheme for the control of labormanagement relations which fall within the reach of the commerce
1s 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942).
79 Id. at 749. Two of the cases cited by Justice Douglas for this proposition appear with
especial frequency. In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207
(1926), the Supreme Court, despite the oft-quoted language, held that a Georgia statute
regulating locomotive equipment was precluded by congressional delegation of power to the
Interstate Co=erce Co=ission in the same area. In Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1,
58 S.Ct. 87 (1937), however, the Supreme Court upheld state inspection and regulation
of tugboats on the basis that an exercise of the state's police power should stand in the
absence of direct and positive conflict with federal statutes.
so 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949).
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power. 81 Second, the agency to which enforcement of this statutory
scheme was entrusted has in turn created a vast network of administrative rules and regulations. As a consequence the Supreme Court has
in a majority of instances found outright or potential conflict between
state and federal regulation, or at least an interference with express or
implied congressional purpose. Only in a peripheral area has the Court
felt warranted in concluding that Congress had no intent either to
protect or to prohibit.
IV
Although the commerce clause and labor-management relations
cases just discussed suggest some of the ideas which the Court may
apply, they also demonstrate that in all fields presenting questions of
federal supersedure, prediction is an uncertain business.
When the Supreme Court takes up the question of whether the
states have been deprived of the power to secure convictions under
their own sedition laws, as it will in reviewing the decision in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 82 a number of possibilities for result and rationale
will be offered. It is conceivable, though not probable, that one or more
of the justices may believe the passage of laws to protect the existence
of the United States and state governments to be an exclusive federal
function. Such a view could proceed in part on the basis of article IV,
section 4 of the Constitution,83 and also on the basis that the federal
government alone possesses the peculiar competence necessary to deal
with the threat of world-wide Communist domination in all of its
manifestations. Of greater significance, in all likelihood, will be the
extent to which the justices may believe the national interest in this
area to be paramount rather than exclusive. An individual justice's
thinking on this point may well determine his decision on the really
critical issue of whether to apply a strict repugnancy test, or a broader
notion of conflict with congressional policy, or finally a doctrine of
occupation of the field. The two recent commerce clause decisions in
California v. Zook and Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood give an indication of
how difficult it is to predict which test may ultimately be used. Both
of these decisions must be categorized as employing a "conflict" ap81 This statement might have been questionable before 1947. The Labor-Management
Relations Act of that year, however, represents an assertion of federal power vastly more
broad than under the earlier Wagner Act. See Ratner, "Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations," 3 LAB. L.J. 750 at 754 (1952).
82 See note 35 supra. For comment on the Nelson case, see 67 HARv. L. REv. 1419
(1954); 29 N.Y. Umv. L. REv. 1293 (1954); and 102 Umv. PA. L. REv. 1089 (1954).
83 This provides that the United States shall guarantee to every state a republican
form of government.
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proach in judging the validity of state laws, but both were 5-4 decisions
and the writer of the majority opinion in the Zook case, Justice Murphy, is now deceased, while the writer of the decision in Wood, Justice
Black, may well feel that state sedition legislation demands application
of the broader test of obstruction of congressional purposes which he
employed in Hines v. Davidowitz. This test has of course been used
since that case and was stated recently in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers. 84 While it is fairly clear that the test of actual
textual repugnancy would in the Nelson case require an approval of
the state legislation, the test of conflict with congressional policy might
well give a different result on several grounds. First, it is not unlikely
that evidence could be introduced which would show that in the actual
process of administration the federal act was being hindered and obstructed by the administration of overlapping state laws. Second, the
argument used in both the Hines and Nelson cases that Congress had
evinced larger concern for individual liberties than had the state legislatures might make a strong appeal to several of the justices. Finally,
the idea of double punishment may be a basis for declaring that Congress would not have intended the state act to stand. In particular, the
distaste of Justice Frankfurter for double punishment, though it is constitutionally permissible, is indicated in his dissent in the Zook case. 85
It is further possible that some members of the Court may' be willing to apply an occupancy test. Should this be the criterion adopted,
the Pennsylvania sedition law could be invalidated on the ground that
Congress had fully occupied the field of anti-sedition legislation, and
that consequently state laws which coincide with the federal acts are
no more permissible than state laws which conflict with the federal
act. 86 An approach of this nature would call for careful scrutiny by the
Court of the legislative history and texts not only of the Smith and
Internal Security Acts, but of the recently-passed "Communist Control
Act of 1954"87 as well. The purposes of this recent act, and its relationship to the earlier statutes, are worth examining in some detail.
The Communist Control Act of 1954 was passed in the closing
days of the second regular session of the Eighty-third Congress. Contemporary observers, even those who might have been in sympathy with
8 4 346 U.S. 485 at 500, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953), where the Court said, "For a state to
impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction
of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods
which the federal Act prohibits."
85 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 at 739-740, 69 S.Ct. 841 (1949).
86 See note 60 supra for Justice Holmes' formulation of the idea that coincidence may
be as repugnant to federal law as conllict.
87 P.L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (August 24, 1954).
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the aims of the legislation, were outspoken in criticism of the highly
political atmosphere and absence of careful consideration which marked
the process of its enactment into law. 88 The records of the debates, it
is believed, will not furnish even the most minimal guidance for construction of the act. Statements made even by those legislators who
spoke with this problem in mind are totally irreconcilable.89 Difficult
as it may be, however, some notions of what Congress was seeking to
accomplish will eventually have to be pieced together.
As first introduced into the Senate, the Communist Control bill
was aimed at the problem of Communist domination of labor unions. 90
The means adopted were the broadening and strengthening of the
Internal Security Act through the addition of new provisions covering
"Communist-infiltrated organizations." The bill was soon amended,
however, to provide that criminal sanctions should attach to membership in the Communist Party when coupled with the commission of
any acts designed to effectuate the purposes of that party.91 The House
of Representatives, which had approved the provisions relating to Communist infiltration of labor unions, questioned the wisdom and the
constitutionality of the Senate addition. 92 As the bill finally came from
88 See editorials in the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, and the
Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1954.
89 On the question whether the act made Communist Party membership a "crime,"
for example, compare statements at 100 CoNG. REc. 14333 (August 19, 1954) with those
at 100 CoNG. REc. 14391 (August 19, 1954).
90The original bill, S. 3706, was reported in 100 CoNG. REc. 9217 (July 6, 1954).
91 This amendment, sponsored by Senator Humphrey of Minnesota, was passed unanimously [100 CoNG. REc. 13583 (August 12, 1954)]. The criminal penalties were to be
those imposed by the Internal Security Act, but were apparently to be applied directly
without the necessity of showing non-compliance with that act.
92 Many Congressmen, on the other hand, strongly favored the Senate amendments.
The principal objection raised in the House was that were Communist Party membership
made a crime the registration provisions of the Internal Security Act would be held invalid
as compelling self-incrimination in violation of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution.
Instructive in this connection is the recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Board. 23 U.S. LAw WEEK 2296 (December 23, 1954).
The Communist Party there sought review of the Board's order that it must register
as a "Communist-action organization" under the Internal Security Act. One objection made
by the party was that the act itself violated the 5th Amendment to the Constitution since
it compelled the furnishing of information which might expose party members to prosecution under the Smith Act. A majority of the court rejected this argument. The principal
grounds for decision on the point were the following: (1) the 5th Amendment privilege
is personal and does not extend to the membership records of an organization; (2) the
statute is not a violation of any criminal statute; (3) as to offenses involving more than
mere membership, there is no assurance that the 5th Amendment privilege would or could
be asserted in some future proceeding, and successful assertion of the privilege would at
most render the act unenforceable in a given case.
Judge Bazelon based his dissent from the opinion of the majority on his conclusion
that the registration provisions of the act could not be reconciled with the 5th Amendment
prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination.
It will be noted that much of the majority's reasoning could be used to support the
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conference, the controversial Senate amendment had been replaced by
provisions which, in their final form, do two things: (1) they strip the
Communist Party of all legal rights and privileges under the laws of
the United States or any political subdivision; (2) they make subject
to the provisions of the Internal Security Act any member of the Communist Party or other organization having as an objective the violent
overthrow of the United States Government, or that of any state. 93
These provisions are preceded by a section in which are stated congressional findings with respect to the conspiratorial and authoritarian
nature of the Communist Party, the policies of which are declared to
be secretly prescribed by the foreign leaders of world Communism.
The conclusion is that "the Communist Party should be outlawed."
It is clear that this most recent federal legislation will be a significant factor in future determinations of the validity of state anti-subversive legislation. How significant a factor it will be is difficult to
say, but a number of observations can be made. First, the Communist
Control Act does not lay the basis for a finding of outright conflict
between federal law and state anti-sedition statutes of the type enacted
by Pennsylvania and by other states. Stated another way, there is no
inconsistency between federal and state laws such that compliance with
one would involve violation of the other. In this respect the new law
does not differ from prior federal legislation in the field. Second, it is
believed that neither the text of the new law nor the reports and debates
which comprise its legislative history contain any clear statement of
congressional intent to preclude the states from passing laws against
sedition, nor do they indicate that Congress wished the states to be free
so to legislate. On the latter point it can at least be argued that had
Congress been seriously disturbed by the holding of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in the Nelson case, it could very easily have eliminated
the force of that decision. 94 In fact it was one of the avowed purposes
of the Communist Control Act to strengthen the Smith Act, which, as
will be remembered, underlay the Pennsylvania court's decision. Third,
Congress has by its detailed declaration and findings of fact bearing
on the nature of the Communist Party reinforced the argument that
internal subversion is a problem of paramount national concern, and
that accordingly there arises what may be called a presumption of
registration provisions of the Internal Security Act even assuming that Congress were to
make Communist Party membership criminal per se.
93

Sections 3 and 4 of P.L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (August 24, 1954).
There is some evidence that Congress, at least in 1950, did not believe that the
Smith Act had pre-empted the field. See H.R. Rep. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 2
(1950); H.R. Rep. No. 1950, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 25-46 (1950).
94
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federal supersedure. An argument based on similar congressional findings made in the Internal Security Act won approval from the dissenting judge in Albertson v. Millard. 95 Fourth, if the controlling test is
to be occupation of the field, the Communist Control Act represents
an extension of federal law further into the area of anti-subversive
legislation, and affords that much more basis for concluding that Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme _of regulation which must
be taken to exclude regulation by the states. In both the Smith Act
and the Communist Control Act Congress expressly recognized and dealt
with attempts to bring about the violent overthrow not only of the United
States Government but also of the states and other political subdivisions. It-is surely a tenable conclusion that Congress has laid a firm
hand upon these matters. Finally, this latest law makes possible the
contention that in rejecting the imposition of direct criminal sanctions
upon membership in the Communist Party or other groups having
similar purposes, Congress indicated that it wished such persons to be
subject to the general provisions of the Internal Security Act and by
implication did not wish to expose them to prosecution un~er state
criminal laws. 96 One answer to this is that Congress decided against
these automatic criminal penalties largely on the suggestion that if they
were to be imposed much of the Internal Security Act would thereby
be rendered unconstitutional. Punishment under state criminal statutes would not raise this issue. 97
The Pennsylvania anti-sedition law shortly to be tested in the
Supreme Court is only one of a variety of state statutes directed at the
problem of subversion. 98 The bulk of these laws are not susceptible to
the objection that they encroach upon areas in which the federal government's interest is supreme. For example, laws prescribing qualifications for teaching, for public employment and incidental benefits,
and for public office are well within the sphere of legitimate state interest. 99 It is equally clear, on the other hand, that states may not, con95 See note 22 supra.
96 This approach was

also consciously rejected by Congress when it chose the registration procedures of the Internal Security Act: See H.R. Rep. No. 2980, 81st Cong.,
2d sess. 5 (1950).
97 Constitutional prohibitions against compulsory self-incrimination restrain only the
government, federal or state, which demands disclosure. United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63 (1931).
98 Reference has already been made to the collection of such laws in GELLHORN, THB
· STATES AND SUBVERSION (1952), and to the note in 66 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1952). To
the state statutes must be added municipal ordinances which seek to accomplish similar
ends. For a listing, see Sutherland, "Freedom and Internal Security," 64 HARv. L. REv.
383 at 388 (1951).
99 State laws which deny the use of election facilities to the Communist Party and
other subversive groups would now seem to be in the clearest accord with congressional
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sistently with the Constitution, act to bar the immigration or naturalization of subversive aliens, withhold passports from members of
Communist organizations, or deny the use of the mails to subversive
groups, since such legislation would intrude upon a domain which is
not only exclusively federal as an initial proposition but one in which
Congress has acted as well.1° 0 The types of state law which raise the
most serious questions of federal pre-emption, in addition to general
laws directed against sedition, are statutes which require the registration of subversive groups, and laws which prohibit membership in the
Communist Party.
State registration statutes can be questioned more properly under
the Internal Security Act than under the Smith Act, since it is with the
registration provisions of the former that the state statutes are largely
coincident. The Communist Control Act may be considered as a reaffirmation of congressional faith in the registration procedures created
under the 1950 act, but sheds little more light on the question whether
Congress intended its procedures to be exclusive. The decision of the
federal district court in Albertson v. Millard provides an excellent
summary of the arguments which can be urged against and on behalf
of state registration requirements. Should an eventual Supreme Court
decision turn upon legislative history, the evidence assembled by Judge
Simons in that case seems to support his conclusion that Congress did
not wish to preclude the states from compelling the registration of
subversive groups.101 In the absence of a more convincing showing of
legislative intent than has thus far been assembled, however, it seems
probable that a decision would not be placed on this ground alone.
Laws which make Communist Party membership illegal per se
involve a more direct conflict with federal statutes and congressional
policies than do laws requiring registration. Section 4(£) of the Internal Security Act provides: "Neither the holding of office nor mempolicy. In fact, to permit such groups to appear on the ballot would now violate that
section of the Communist Control Act which declares that these organizations are not
entitled to any rights, privileges or immunities heretofore granted by the United States or
political subdivisions. The question would rather seem to be whether Congress has not
intruded into areas of exclusive state concern. For a discussion of these matters prior to
this recent legislation see 25 NoTRB DAME LAWYER 319 (1950).
100 The federal statutes involved are, respectively, the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 66 Stat. L. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1101 et seq. and the Internal
Security Act, 64 Stat. L. 993 and 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §§785 and 789. It
should also be apparent that states cannot seek to regulate Communist influence in labor
unions where the unions are within the sphere of federal power.
101 A summary of the legislative history of the Internal Security Act is furnished in
EMERSON AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS m THB UNITBD STAT.BS 595-596
(1952). Judge Simons pointed particularly to the fact that in the House Committee Debates
when an amendment was offered extending the bill to any government in the United States
it was ruled not germane since the bill dealt only with the federal government.
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bership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute
per sea violation of ... this section or of any other criminal stdtute."102
The meaning of this final phrase is not clear. If it may be taken to
include state statutes, then a direct conB.ict between federal and state
law is unmistakable. If it is taken to refer only to federal statutes,
there is a question of contravention of congressional policy that Communist Party membership per se is not to constitute a crime.103 The
effect of the Communist Control Act in this regard is uncertain. There
are members of Congress who believe that Congress has itself declared
Communist Party membership to be a crime.104 The better interpretation of the act is believed to be that Congress meant to subject members
of the Communist Party and other like groups to the registration procedure of the Internal Security Act and to the penalties provided in
that act for non-registration. This interpretation of the Communist
Control law is strongly supported in the text itself, and in one part of
the act Congress specifically provided: "That nothing in this section
shall be construed as amending the Internal Security Act of 1950, as
amended."105
In formulating conclusions as to the probable impact of supersedure doctrines on state anti-subversive legislation, perhaps the most
that can be said is that there exists a £.rm though not unassailable basis
for invalidating many of these state laws. Invalidation may proceed
not so much on the ground of exclusive federal power or direct conHict
with federal law as on the ground of obstruction of congressional purpose or invasion of a federally-occupied field. Recent legislation has
put the federal government further into the business of suppressing
subversion. It may be, however, that the Supreme Court's relative
tolerance of state anti-subversive legislation on other constitutional
grounds will extend to its conclusions as to pre-emption.106 If actual
legislative intent is to be weighed, moreover, a likely estimate is that
few members of Congress favor denying the states power to protect
themselves from the danger of forcible overthrow.
Stat. L. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §783. Emphasis added.
See the discussion of the point in note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 327 at 330-331 (1952).
104 Congressman Dies of Texas stated, "The legislative intent of this House is that
membership in the Communist Party constitutes a crime in itself, and can be punished as
such." 100 CoNG REc. 14333 (August 19, 1954).
105 Section 3, P.L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (August 24, 1954). This is the
section which deprives the Communist Party and like organizations of all rights and privileges under the laws of the United States or political subdivisions.
106 See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380 (1952); Garner v.
Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951); and Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,
341 U.S. 56, 71 S.Ct. 565 (1951). In these cases the state and municipal regulations
concerned matters conceded to be within the states' legitimate domain.
102 64
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